Transitioning From Closed to Open Systems Research Paper

Transitioning From Closed to Open Systems - Research Paper Example Apparently, the nursing sector has an open and closed system of solving problems. In the open system a nursing facility is at freewill to look for external help from other facilities and organizations. However, closed system perspectives state that a facility will only seek solutions from the internal environment. The latter limits the number of solutions to the existing problems. In recent times, many health facilities have experienced a shortage in the number of nurses that should attend to patients. Nurses are considered vital in ensuring all the patients are recuperating at a desirable rate. This is owing to the basic services that are offered by the nurses which include exercises, administering drugs, feeding and cleaning of patients. Without adequacy in such services patients will not recover in good time. Therefore, shortage of nurses in the nursing sector is a blow as the patients rarely get the services they need (Smith, 2010). One prevalent issue is the lack of sufficient number of nurses, especially in the ICU. Most patients who are taken to the ICU require intensive care that involves various delicate services. Acceptable standards state that there should be at least one nurse taking care of two patients in the ICU. Nevertheless, in most health facilities this is a rare ratio. Most of the nurses have to offer their services to at least three patie nts, which obviously overworks the nurses leading to poor service delivery. In bizarre incidents a single nurse is forced to serve four patients in the ICU. This highly degrades the quality of services offered across the nursing profession. As such, it jeopardizes the health and safety of the patients in the ICU as well as the reputation of particular health institutions. Shortage of nurses is a prevalent problem that risks the lives of patients. There are various ways of solving the problem though. However, it would be a hard task to use a closed

Research summary Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

Research summary - Assignment Example The Australian Government makes unprecedented investment in the education sector; particular emphasis is laid on the improvement of the state of undergraduate education in the country and the technical training facilities. It makes investments in universities and other tertiary education channels with the aim of driving an overall comprehensive reform in the training sector in the economy and the post-compulsory education sector (Pritchett 367). This includes a two-fold step; short term injection of fund to the weak areas of the economy on one hand and on the other hand, building up on the strengths of the education sector in the economy. At present the education sector of Australia is strong enough to boost up the economic potential of the economy. The government is making a realistic plan for the next decade in order to ensure that current activities to reform the country’s higher education system makes it sustainable in the future. A description of the relevant economic mod el There is considerable debate regarding the effect of public expenditure on growth (Basu and Bhattarai, â€Å"Does Government Spending on Education Promote Growth and Schooling Returns?†). According to some scholars, there is mixed effect of positive public expenditure on the growth of an economy in the long run (Pritchett 371). Sylwester shows that in some countries the effect of government’s financial support on the contemporary higher education (under graduate studies and training) sector casts an impact on the growth of the economy depending on the level of education of the general population of the country (Sylwester 380). According to economic theory, growth is positively correlated to returns to higher education. Simultaneously, research shows that the higher the level of government education on education sector, the lower is the level of growth in the country compared to other countries with lower spending on education sector by government. In other words the countries with higher rates of growth reflect lower public spending on education sector. Regression analysis on time series data shows, government spending on education has positive effect on economic growth for the richer countries, but, for the poorer countries it can potentially hurt growth (Blankeau, Simpson and Tomljanovich 396). Studies show that the relationship existing between government spending on education and economic growth is negative for the countries with low share of higher education, while, for countries with high share of education, this relationship is positive (Basu and Bhattarai, â€Å"Does Government Spending on Education Promote Growth and Schooling Returns?†). This phenomenon suggests that a non linear and potentially U shaped relationship might be present between growth and public spending on education (Blankeau, Simpson and Tomljanovich 397). Australia is a developed nation and the per capita GDP in the country is US $ 43,300 (according to 2012 es timates) (â€Å"The World Fact book†). The level of growth in the economy shows a rising trend over the past two decades. Therefore, the level of

Which two sites give you the best tips on how to negotiate Essay

Which two sites give you the best tips on how to negotiate - Essay Example It is obligatory that there are at least two participants whose interests are partially common and partially different. Negotiation are the fact of our everyday life, the main means of getting what you want. Though we negotiate every day, it is not easy. Usually people are confronted with the dilemma – to be complaisant or to be strict. The other way of negotiating is a middle approach between complaisant and strict, it includes the attempt to reach agreement between goal striving and being on good terms with people. The world negotiating experience knows much about how to come to the successful agreement and that is why many tips that are usually performed in books and internet are avaliable. Speaking about the tips on how to negotiate we can divide them into some groups: psychological tips, ethical and aesthetic tips, these groups are general for any field of negotiations, and the third group includes professional tips which are different for every field. We investigated four suggestions of tips on how to negotiate made by different authors. Most of the tips given are of psychological character. The analysis of these suggestions will help us to define the best tips which can be used for having successful negotiations. The first suggestion of tips gives such pieces of advice (Braham B.): know thyself; learn the partner you are negotiating with before you start; think on what you want, what your partner wants and on your supposition about what he thinks you want; try to build trust; listen attentively, begin with stating your positions; be confident; know what options you have; know what a win is and the last point is to enjoy the negotiations process.(Braham B.) The number of tips suggested is very good and can be helpfull during the process of negotiations. To my mind stating the positions at the beginning is a very important thing which helps to built trust, in case if person sounds confidently.

Human Indifference Essay Example for Free

Human Indifference Essay In the article â€Å"Americans are shopping while Iraq burns†, Bob Herbert implies that Americans are deeply absorbed in their own interests and are therefore apathetic to developments in Iraq, and by extension the developments in any other place where the United States is at war like in Afghanistan. On the contrary, renowned photojournalist James Natchwey is of the opinion that Americans would like to be informed of what really is happening so that they can act responsively. This must have been his conviction before embarking on his mission to film footage for the documentary â€Å"War Photographer†. A number of credible sources underline this apathetic stance adapted by many Americans regarding the suffering that emanates from wars waged by their nation in their name. This research paper aims to identify both their stances in detail with the aim of establishing which perspective is closer to the truth. It also pays a tribute to James Natchwey’s exemplary journalism. The State of the American Society Bob Herbert creates a reference for his argument on Thanksgiving Day here in the U. S. Shopping malls opened at midnight as Americans gleefully spend on the celebration. In the meantime, over 200 civilians had been killed by car bombs in the Iraqi city of Sadr. This is just one incident: a majority of Americans go about their business oblivious of the suffering Iraqi civilians endure on a daily basis or the fatalities American troops encounter at the battlefields. If indeed they were conscious of the repercussions of the war, we would be up in protest opposing these wars whose benefits to the American society cannot be ascertained. The apathy demonstrated by Americans may originate from the fact that very few Americans are concerned with the nation’s foreign policy. As Ole R. Holsti points out, there is â€Å"absence of sustained public attention to international issues† (Holsti 2004, 285). This is demonstrated in the circumstances that led to the invasion of Iraq: the Bush administration alleged without sufficient proof that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (Smith 2005) and connected the Baghdad regime with the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, and the American public was ready to believe these charges in the pretext that Iraq really was a threat to national security (Holsti 2004). Media in the U. S. as made it hard for Americans to know what to believe in or what to value. There is insufficient coverage of the destructiveness of the war as media executives strive to make profits in an overly commercialized industry. The importance of news is diluted as news is â€Å"stripped of its credibility and the audience will have no ability to differentiate between the values of news and other forms of entertainment† (Dadge Schechter 2006, 103). As Bob Herbert points out, most Americans have no personal stake in the Iraqi war and are consequently indifferent to its outcomes. A short survey reveals that very few citizens would be willing to join the military, no wonder most go about their business bearing indifference to the effects of the war on Iraqi civilians whose lives are shattered by war (Gott 2002) and U. S marines who die in the line of duty. The suggestion by Representative Charles Rangel that the Draft be reinstated implies that American politicians would be reluctant to approve of war if the possibility of their constituents being called into active service was real. With these facts out in the open, Herbert’s position is obviously more credible. Media apathy, domestic lack of interest in foreign policy and general disinterest have all contributed to the absence of a collective sacrifice and sharing of the burden of responsibility on the war. This is supported by the other sources cited in this paper. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy is a comprehensive text describing in detail American foreign policy since September 11th. Why War: The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez is a thought-provoking text which pushes a reader beyond the periphery of conventional sociological thought. David Dadge and Danny Schechter’s book exposes the ease with which the American public is in most case willing to acknowledge intelligence reports without the desire to validate the background information. War Photographer James Natchwey demonstrates true heroism as he delves deep into some of the most dangerous and desolate spots on earth to bring pictures of what really goes on here to viewers. His work captivates audiences and instills empathy by relaying the destruction and heartbreak occasioned by conflict. He is an embodiment of courage, professional dedication and humanitarianism.

Reflective Practice And Risk Social Work Essay

Reflective Practice And Risk Social Work Essay A good risk decision requires both good risk assessment and good risk management (Carson and Bain, 2008: 156). The intention of this assignment is to critically evaluate this statement with reference to my own practice experience. With the focus of this piece of practice being on children, this assignment will predominantly explore risk from the perspective of children. The assignment will start with a brief outline of the practice experience that will be referred to and will explore the social, cultural and political concepts that shape practice in relation to risk. The concepts of risk, risk assessment and risk management will be examined along with what makes them good. The assignment will then explore how Brearleys (1982) risk assessment was used before looking at theoretical frameworks of reflection. The practice experience that I will be referring to throughout this piece of work is the assessment process in preparation for a Full Assessment Report that had been requested from the Childrens Reporter Administration due to concerns for the safety of a child. During a domestic incident between Mr and Mrs Hassan, their son Raj (aged 12) was struck on the side of the face by Mr Hassan. As a result of bail conditions Mr Hassam was not allowed within a certain distance of the family home and he was not present during the first half of the assessment process. However halfway through the assessment process Mr Hassam was charged and convicted a Schedule 1 offender, with bail conditions no longer in place Mr Hassam returned to the family home. Towards the end of the twentieth century risk became a major concern within western society; Beck (1992) argues that we live in a risk society that has an emphasis on uncertainty and blame, and there is no longer a focus on succeeding in doing something good but where we are preventing the worst. Parton (1996) would agree with Beck and believes that globalisation has separated society and in turn created more uncertainty within social and economic life. As a result of the blaming culture professionals are finding themselves avoiding taking risks and feeling that they have to defend their practice and risk decisions (McLaughlin, 2007 and Barry, 2007). The media and public blame practitioners, particularly when there is a child death, and state that they put children at unnecessary high risk as they fail to intervene quickly enough. Examples of high profile child death inquiry cases include Jasmine Beckford (1985), Caleb Ness (2003) and Baby P (2008). Baby P is an excellent example of how the media and public blame practitioners and received high media attention. Media coverage of how risk assessments and risk managements have failed along with demands for minimising risks and organisational and professional accountability has constrained the role of a social worker and The 21st Century Review of Social Work (2006) acknowledges this (Barry, 2007). It implies that social work professionals were lacking in confidence when it came to taking risks in what has become a risk adverse society. One of the main areas highlighted in the report was the need for a new organisational culture and approach to risk assessment and risk management wh ich would promote merit (Scottish Executive, 2006). Official policies and guidance have been developed in recent years with the aim of improving practices and knowledge where high risks can be identified (DOH, 1991 cited in Parton, 1996). This is evident in documents that influenced my practice and I referred to them before making risk decisions, some examples include; Getting it Right for Every Child: Proposal for Action (Scottish Executive, 2005), Every Child Matters: Change for Children (HM Government, 2004) and Its everyones job to make sure Im alright: Report of the Child Protection Audit and Review (Scottish Executive, 2002). The word risk is a complex and comprehensive concept and there is no clear definition when it comes to defining what would be a low, medium or high risk (Stalker, 2003 and Barry, 2007). Many of the problems that arise during risk taking is a result of there being no exact definition of risk (Titterton, 2005). This in turn creates difficulties when defining definitions of risk, risk assessment and risk management. The Oxford English Dictionary (2002) describes the noun risk as a situation that could lead to a bad outcome or the likelihood of something unpleasant happening, and the verb risk as being exposed to danger or loss or act in a way that something bad could happen. All dictionary definitions will give the word risk negative meanings. Alaszewski and Manthorpe (1991) would agree with the negative dictionary definitions of risk and define it as, the possibility that a given course of action will not achieve its desired outcome but instead some undesired and undesirable situation will develop. Similarly Blackburn (2000) views risk as being a loss or cost as a result of uncertainty (cited in Carson and Bain, 2008). Carson and Bain (2008) and Titterton (2005) disagree with negative meanings of the word risk; they argue that such definitions are not good enough as they pose more difficulties when taking risks with peoples lives. They both argue that risk needs to be explained as looking at the potential benefits and also the potential harms. Alberg (1996) provides a useful definition of risk as, the possibility of beneficial and harmful outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence in a stated timescale (cited in Titterton, 2005:25). Risk assessment is the stage in risk decision making where information on the elements of risk is collated and assessed, they are usually made to inform risk management. Risk assessment is concerned with collecting information on the two key risk elements; these are known as the outcomes (also known as the consequences, harm or damage) and their likelihood (also known as chance or exposure) and to assess a risk we must consider both (Carson and Bain, 2008, Titterton, 2005). The two basic assessment tools used to assess risk are; clinical which involves professional judgement and information from research on risk factors, and actuarial is based upon statistical calculations of risk and is used in the insurance industry (Barry, 2007 and Davies, 2008). Although not exclusively, actuarial data tends to be used during risk assessments and clinical during risk management (Carson and Bain, 2008). In order to undertake a good risk assessment we should include all the outcomes that could occur as a result of the risk decision and which could happen in the period that the risk is being assessed. If an outcome would happen regardless of a risk assessment being made then it did not happen as a result of a risk decision. The risk decision must have made the outcome more likely or serious; both the seriousness of the outcomes and their likelihood must be considered (Carson and Bain, 2008). When assessing the likelihood of a situation it should be based upon the best knowledge available and whether the decision would have been the same had a responsible body (i.e. SSSC) had considered it (Carson and Bain, 2008). A good risk assessment has a purpose and this is to explore the potential benefits over the possible harms. If the value of the likely benefits outweighs the value of the likely harms then we will be able to justify taking a risk decision (Titterton, 2005). We need to be able to justify taking a risk before we can learn whether harm will result. If harm does result then it is not bad risk assessment, similarly if a risk decision leads to successful outcomes we cannot say it is good risk assessment. A risk decision needs to be judged on the risk decision processes and procedures, not by the outcomes (Carson and Bain, 2008). It could be argued that there are no benefits of taking a risk and this would be deemed as bad risk assessment and must be challenged (Carson and Bain, 2008). After a risk assessment has been carried out a decision needs to be made on how to manage the situation. Risk management is discovering and controlling the dimensions of the proposed risk into a plan to manage the risks; it is involved with implementing, monitoring, influencing, controlling and reviewing the risk decision (Carson and Bain, 2008). Risk dimensions are features of risk that could be influenced by the practitioner, for example the available resources to manage the risk and uncertainty (Carson and Bain, 2008). Risk management also means making the most of the potential benefits and including service users in managing risk decisions (Stalker, 2003). In order to have good risk management we must be able to make effective use of all the dimensions of the risk assessment. This includes the time during and the amount of time of a risk decision being made and the time available to intervene if necessary. We need to be able to identify people and their skills as a resource and use their qualities, knowledge and ability to recognise problems and opportunities should they arise. We should identify and consider both positive and negative opportunities that arise at different stages as we go along a risk path. Before making a risk decision we must explore the quality and quantity of available knowledge and its significance. Knowledge is a form of power and this creates degrees of control, this includes recognising our professional, ethical and legal limits to intervene and control a risk. Good risk management is being able to use all of these resources however there is a barrier, they all cost money. Risk management is political as it is about resources, we require adequate resources for a good risk management plan and lack of resources will have an impact on this (Carson and Bain, 2008). Risk decisions are complex and may be based on unreliable or uncertain knowledge. If harm could not occur then it would not be a risk, if harms do occur then decision making and risk management will need to be examined and a risk decision that was justifiable before the event must remain justifiable after the event. The practitioner will also need to show that any decisions they did make were in line with best current practice on risk assessment and risk management. Many risk decisions will be good irrespective of poor risk management. (Carson and Bain, 2008 and Davies, 2008). Risk management is often overshadowed by risk assessment, despite the fact that it can only identify a risk and not lessen it (Stalker, 2003 and Titterton, 2005). It is important to give risk management more credit as it can prevent bad risk assessment. If a poor risk assessment is made then it can result in harm, inquiries and court proceedings. As risk management comes after the risk assessment has been made it can in turn prevent a poor risk assessment from causing harm (Carson and Bain, 2008). Also risk management concerns the implementation of the risk decision and can therefore protect against the consequences of poor risk assessment. In order to make a good risk decision we therefore require good risk assessment and good risk management (Carson and Bain, 2008). Titterton (2005) argues that risk assessment and risk management should be interconnected within the same risk framework. Brearleys (1982) definition of risk focuses on the negative outcomes of risk (i.e. damage and harm) however despite its restrictions it is argued that it is relevant as he has provided a framework that provides a good starting point for understanding and assessing risk, and that helps assist workers to recognise risk factors when faced with risky situations (Watson and West, 2006 and Kemshall and Pritchard, 1996). Brearleys risk assessment framework is interactive and uses concepts of the systems approach, task centred approach to the actuarial assessment of risk. His framework identifies two types of hazards which he refers to as general predictive hazards (background hazards) and situational hazards (current hazards); a hazard is the possibility of loss or damage that will result in danger. These hazards need to be weighed up with the strengths in order to identify if a risk decision has to be made (Kemshall and Pritchard, 1996). I incorporated Brearleys (1982) framework with the assessment triangle (DOH, 2000 and Aldgate and Rose, 2006) during my risk assessment and I identified that identified that there were no general predictive factors for Raj, he was not known to social work prior to this assault and there was no evidence to suggest that there had been any issues in the past. The situational hazards for Raj were; he had been assaulted by Mr Hassam, his behaviour changed and he became withdrawn and angry, poverty and poor housing. His strengths were; he was resilient, he attended and enjoyed school, he openly spoke out about how he felt. The danger for Raj was that he was at risk of further physical and/or emotional abuse for being open and honest with me after his father had warned him not to speak to any professionals. During my risk assessment I had to consider how capable Mr Hassam was of further assaulting Raj and how likely it was to happen. I thought about the severity of the outcomes, for example if I thought there was a chance that the outcome would be death then the likelihood would be lower than if I thought the outcome could be assault. I therefore considered the outcome of my assessment to be that Mr Hassam could assault Raj again and although the outcome could be very serious but I felt that the likelihood of it happening was very low as Mr Hassam had never been violent towards his son before and showed true signs of remorse for his actions. However just because it was extremely unlikely that Mr Hassam would assault Raj again did not mean that I could consider it a low risk. An unlikely event does not become any more likely merely as it could have serious outcomes (Carson and Bain, 2008). During my assessment I referred to The Children (Scotland) Act 1995 as I had a duty to safeguard an d promote the welfare of Raj and his welfare is paramount (SCLC, 1995), and also to the values of the SSSC (2005), particularly codes 4.1 and 4.2. When considering the risk period to work within and how we are basing our assessment we should examine research based upon that period. During my risk assessment I looked at research on domestic violence and child abuse and several studies show that there is a high association between domestic violence and child abuse (physical and emotional); Morely and Mullender (1994) found that between 40-60% of children are physically assaulted by the perpetrator and Epsein and Keep (1994) found that 38% of children who called Childline had been assaulted by the perpetrator. To make the use of the highest knowledge available I also consulted with my practice teacher and PTL and considered their recommendations before making my decision. My risk decision was that it was safe for Raj to remain in the family home with his father, as the potential benefits (e.g. prior to the assault Raj and his father had a good relationship) outweighed the likely harms. I was able to work in partnership with Mr and Mrs Hassan and the school and they were all resources that assisted me with identifying opportunities for Raj. On reflection I felt confident that I had used the resources available to me well, particularly research and knowledge and I could justify my risk decision if harm was to occur and would be able to explain how I came to my risk decision. Reflective practice involves being able to think holistically and in turn this includes exploring facts and feelings, the knowledge and understanding of the situation and being able to look at perspectives subjectively and objectively (Wilson et al, 2008). Schà ¶n (1983), Kolb (1984) and Boud et al (1985) have given reflective practice currency in recent years by developing ideas and using and applying them to reflecting on experience and improving action and practice (Brown and Rutter, 2008). I based my reflective accounts in practice on Kolbs (1984) model of experiential learning. Kolbs model explores having concrete practice experience which we then reflect and observe on, construct new ideas on and then experiment with. His model emphasises the importance of using observation and testing our reflection on what we see and experience and being able to build upon how we experience the real world (Adams et al, 2002). Kolbs model has helped me understand that learning is individual a nd I have to make the connections to existing knowledge, theories and legislation when reflecting on what I have learned. A number of self evaluation questionnaires derived from Kolbs learning cycle with the aim of helping people identify their learning styles. I used Honey and Mumfords (1992) learning style questionnaire to discover that I am a reflective learner; I will watch and reflect, gather relevant data and examine all the possible options available before making a decison. Using my learning style as a reflector and incorporating Kolbs model of learning I was able to confidently make a risk decision for Raj. I used the supervision process to discuss my learning style and how this assisted me when I put plans of action in place with the Hassam family and how I went through the cycle of experience, reflection, conceptualisation and experimentation (Parker, 2006). To conclude this piece of work has proved that in order to have a good risk decision then we must have a good risk assessment along with good risk management and my own practice experience was integrated throughout as an illustrative. Todays risk society has a lack of confidence in professionals and this has an impact when they need to make risk decisions, although after using risk and reflective frameworks along with supervision I was confident to be able to make my risk decision and justify it. With the right policies, procedures and support professionals will be able to make good risk decisions and feel confident when doing so.

The Strategies The Meiji Government Used to Achieve Economic Developmen

The Strategies The Meiji Government Used to Achieve Economic Development? The Meiji government during the 1880's created both an institutional and constitution structure that allowed Japan in the coming decades to be a stabile and industrializing country. Two major policies and strategies that reinforced stability and economic modernization in Japan were the creation of a national public education system and the ratification of the Meiji constitution. Both these aided in stability and thus economic growth. The creation of a national education system aided in creating stability because it indoctrinated youth in the ideas of loyalty, patriotism, and obedience. Japan's education system at first stressed free thought and the ideas of individual's exploration of knowledge but by 1890 the education system of Japan became a tool for indoctrination into what Peter Duus calls "a kind of civil religion" with the Imperial Rescript on Education. This Rescript stressed two things. First, it stressed loyalty to the emperor and to a lesser extant to the state. In every classroom a picture of the emperor was placed. Second, the education system stressed self sacrifice to the state and family. Filial piety was taught in schools and applied not only to the family but also to the national family which included father, teacher, official and employer. The Japanese education system also created a system of technical schools and universities both public and private that educated a grow...

Military Downsizing

Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER What Options Might the Pentagon Consider When Discussing the Downsizing of the Services as Well as Change Overseas Basing Richard Giadone Columbia Southern University MBA 5652 Research Methods Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER Permanently stationing forces overseas gives the U. S. military a strategic advantage–but at a price. That price is paid not only in terms of budgetary cost but in terms of the personnel, units, and equipment needed to support forces stationed outside the United States. We will compare the U. S. forces stationed in Europe and East Asia against the monetary and personnel cost of keeping them there. Forward Based Versus Forward Deployed Forces The U. S. forces can be maintained overseas on either temporary or a permanent basis. Units or personnel that are in a foreign country on a permanent basis are said to be forward based or forward stationed. In contrast, units and their associated personnel that are in a foreign country for a limited time, typically six months or a year, while taking part in exercises or operations are said to be forward deployed. An example of such forces is those now deployed in Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom. ) Although the distinction may appear to be minimal, it has important consequences for military forces and personnel. Forward Based Units Units that are permanently based outside the United States remain in place while individuals assigned to the units come and go. For example, the 2nd Infantry Division (2nd I D) has been stationed in South Korea since the 1950s, as a result of the Korean War armistice. While the division, with its headquarters and subordinate units, remain in place, some 13,000 Army soldiers rotate through it on one-year unaccompanied tours. The services are now allowing families to accompany service members to Korea for two Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER year tours. Korea has an 8% personnel turnover each month. And, 20% of all Soldiers on assignment to Korea never show. In other locations, such as Germany, U. S. military personnel serve three year tours with units stationed there and can bring their families with them. With the help of allies, the United States has built up large infrastructures overseas to support forward stationed units, assigned personnel, and their families. Almost all overseas bases that permanently house large numbers of U. S. service members include all of the amenities of bases in the United States, such as commissaries, chapels, exercise facilities, and post offices. In addition, in places where families may accompany service members, the Department of Defense (DoD) has established schools for military dependents. In Germany alone, DoD runs 70 schools for more than 30,000 children who are dependents of U. S. military personnel and DoD civilians. Another aspect of forward based units is that personnel serving with them are considered on permanent assignment instead of temporary duty and thus undergo a â€Å"permanent change of station† (PCS) when they move from an assignment in the United States to an assignment overseas. In a PCS move, service members can take along their household goods (including automobiles) at the government's (taxpayer’s) expense, regardless of whether they are accompanied by family members. The fact that personnel are assigned to, and move in and out of forward based units on an individual basis creates continual turnover in those units. With the three-year tours common in Germany, one-third of the individuals in a particular unit will turn over every Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER year and the entire population will turn over in three years. Moreover, when individuals complete a tour with a forward-based unit, they are generally assigned to a different unit in the United States than the one they served in before going overseas. Forward Deployed Units Forward deployed forces, such as those now in Afghanistan or Kosovo, are overseas on a temporary basis only. The United States does not anticipate having forces stationed in Iraq or Afghanistan for the next 50 years, as it has done in Germany. Rather, it anticipates that once Afghanistan is secure, U. S. troops will be withdrawn and not replaced. As a consequence, the United States has no plans to build elaborate bases to house U. S. forces in Afghanistan. Likewise, for the most part, military personnel are not assigned to duty in Afghanistan the same way they are to duty in South Korea or Germany. If a unit based in the United States, such as the 25th Infantry Division, is assigned to duty in Afghanistan for nine months to a year, all of the personnel associated with the division who are eligible will deploy to Afghanistan for the length of the tour. Neither soldiers' personal belongings (excluding some individual items) nor their families will accompany them. Furthermore, as much as possible, all of the individuals assigned to the unit will deploy and stay with it for the entire period and return to the home base together. Those deployed forces are often included in tallies of U. S. forces overseas, but in fact they are officially considered to be overseas on a temporary basis, even though some operations supported by rotational deployments have continued for years    Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER U. S. Forces Based in Europe The United States has about 100,000 military personnel forward based in Europe. The bulk of them are stationed in Germany, where the United States has maintained forces since the end of World War II, originally as an occupation force and later as part of NATO's defense during the Cold War. Although the size of U. S. forces in Europe declined by two thirds after the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the need to maintain the current levels is being questioned by some defense analysts and Administration officials. Army Forces The Army accounts for about 60 percent of active duty U. S. personnel stationed in Europe. Despite significant cuts in those personnel after the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the Army continues to base two of its 10 divisions and one of its four corps in Europe. Thus, a significant portion of the Army's combat power is stationed on that continent, primarily in Germany. Nevertheless, the Army's combat units (divisions and brigades) account for less than half of the service's active duty personnel in Europe. The 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division (mechanized) has only two of its three combat brigades and about 12,500 of its total 16,000 personnel based in Germany. The Army's other combat unit in Europe–the 173rd Airborne Brigade, based in Vicenza, Italy–has about 1,000 personnel assigned to it. Thus, the Army's permanent active-duty combat forces in Europe total about 26,000 people. Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER Another 27,000 or so active-duty personnel are assigned to what the Army calls combat-support (CS) units, such as artillery, and combat-service-support (CSS) units, such as transportation. CS and CSS units provide various kinds of support to combat brigades and divisions. The other 7,000 or so active-duty Army personnel based in Europe are assigned to what could be termed administrative units, such as medical facilities, NATO headquarters in Brussels, and contracting agencies. In all, about 43 percent of Army forces in Europe are assigned to combat units, 45 percent to support units, and 12 percent to administrative duties. (The breakdown for Army forces in Germany is similar: 45 percent combat, 45 percent support, and 10 percent administrative. ) Army Bases The Army maintains an extensive network of bases in Europe, encompassing almost 300 installations. Like its personnel, the vast majority of the Army's overseas infrastructure (255 installations) is in Germany. The largest and some of the most expensive Army bases in Europe are at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany. Those two training facilities–which provide ranges and space where Army units can practice tactics and maneuvers–cover 52,000 acres and 40,000 acres, respectively, and have a combined replacement value of more than $1. 5 billion. (6) The Army also maintains 33 barracks for unaccompanied soldiers and 36 â€Å"villages† for family housing in Germany, which have a replacement value of roughly $14 billion. Other Army installations in Germany include five hospitals, five hotels, 15 smaller training areas, nine airfields, four Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER depots, three golf courses, a Boy Scout camp, and a Girl Scout camp. That infrastructure is designed to enhance soldiers' morale and, to some extent, replicate the facilities and conveniences that would be found around many Army bases in the United States. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Forces and Bases The other three services have fewer forces stationed in Europe than the Army does. In addition, they have not concentrated their forces and bases on that continent in Germany to the extent that the Army has. The Air Force maintains the second largest presence in Europe after the Army, with 34,000 active-duty personnel and 201 installations in 12 countries. The largest contingent (15,000 active-duty personnel) is based in Germany, but the Air Force also has relatively large numbers of people in the United Kingdom (10,000) and Italy (4,000). The service's major combat units are distributed similarly, with Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy each hosting one fighter wing. The greatest numbers of Air Force installations in Europe are located in Germany. The base at Ramstein, Germany, is the main air hub for U. S. forces from all services flying to or from other parts of the world, including the United States and the Middle East. The Air Force also has strategically important installations in the United Kingdom and Greenland. The air bases at Mildenhall and Lakenheath in the United Kingdom were used extensively to support U. S. operations against Libya and during Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. The Air Force's facility in Thule, Greenland, includes radar Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER that is designed to provide early warning of an intercontinental ballistic missile attack and is expected to be part of the Bush Administration's network of missile defenses. Thus, although the Air Force does not have as many installations in Europe as the Army does, several of its bases have played–and continue to play–major roles in supporting U. S. military operations. The Navy and Marine Corps, because of the nature of their activities, have a far smaller onshore presence. Neither service bases any combat forces on shore in Europe, although the Navy has 10,000 support and administrative personnel there, nor the Marine Corps has 1,000. (7) In addition, the Navy maintains 15 installations in Europe, including two air stations (in Iceland and Italy). U. S. Forces Based in East Asia and the Pacific After Europe, the region with the largest permanent U. S. military presence overseas is East Asia and the Pacific, where approximately 80,000 personnel are stationed (see Table 2-1). Virtually all of them are based in two countries: Japan, where all four services have a significant presence, and South Korea, where the Army and the Air Force have stationed combat forces. In addition, the Navy and Air Force maintain a small number of installations (and fewer than 1,000 permanent personnel) in Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Singapore. Army Forces Since the Korean War, the Army has maintained a major presence in South Korea, where 28,000 Army personnel are now based. Their mission is to enforce the 1953 Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER cease-fire that ended hostilities under the auspices of the United Nations as well as to deter an attack by North Korea–or, should deterrence fail, help to repel an invasion or mount a counterattack to expel the invading force. Today, the 2nd ID is stationed in northern South Korea with two of its combat brigades, accounting for about 13,000 troops. The division's third brigade is based at Fort Lewis, Washington. ) Of the other 15,000 Army personnel in South Korea, about 13,000 are assigned to combat-support and combat-service-support units that are part of the Eighth Army, which serves as the high-level command organization for the Army in South Korea. The remaining 2,000 Army personnel in that country are assigned to units that perform administrative ta sks. The Army's representation elsewhere in the region is limited to Japan, where about 2,000 personnel are stationed. Those forces provide forward presence and support for regional contingencies and are also charged with helping to defend Japan if necessary. They include one special-forces battalion, some CS and CSS units, and several hundred soldiers assigned to administrative units. Army Bases The Army has a total of 95 installations in East Asia–80 in South Korea and the rest in Japan. The most expensive Army installation in the region is Yongsan Garrison, located in the center of Seoul. It is home to 7,000 military personnel assigned to the headquarters of U. S. Forces Korea and other command organizations and has a replacement value of $1. 3 billion. The Army's 15 installations in Japan, which support a Running Head: WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT THE PENTAGON CONSIDER much smaller force, include a housing area, three ammunition depots, and other logistics facilities, such as a port, a pier, and a fuel-handling facility. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Forces and Bases Although both the Navy and the Air Force have installations in several East Asian countries, their bases and forces are concentrated in Japan (see Appendix A for more details). On the basis of replacement value, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations in Japan represent 88 percent of the three services' investment in the region. Air Force. The Air Force has 23,000 airmen stationed in East Asia and the Pacific, with more than half of them based in Japan. Half of the personnel in Japan are assigned to support and administrative units, although 7,000 are associated with the tactical fighter units stationed there. In contrast, the majority of the 10,000 Air Force personnel stationed in South Korea are combat forces, associated with the two fighter wings based in that country. The Air Force maintains a total of 67 installations in Asia to support and house its forces. Japan hosts the majority of them (44) as well as several large or valuable installations, such as Kadena Air Base, the nearby Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex, and Misawa Air Base. Together, those three installations have a replacement value of $9 billion. Air Force installations in South Korea are not as extensive as those in Japan, but they include two large air bases: one at Kunsan on the western coast and one at Osan, less than 50 miles south of the North Korean border. Those two bases have a combined replacement value of about $3 billion. Navy. Since World War II, the Navy has had a significant presence and interest in East Asia. The base at Yokosuka, Japan–home to the Seventh Fleet and the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk–is considered the Navy's largest and most strategically important overseas installation in the world. Furthermore, the Kitty Hawk's air wing, which is based in Japan when the carrier is in port, is the Navy's only forward-stationed air wing. All told, the Navy has about 6,000 personnel based on shore in Japan. To support its presence in Japan, the Navy maintains 12 installations, six of which are estimated to have a replacement value of more than $1 billion each. Its facilities at Yokosuka alone have a combined value of $5. 7 billion. The Navy also operates a base at Sasebo, which hosts an amphibious squadron, and a naval air facility at Atsugi. In all, the Navy's installations in Japan have an estimated replacement value of approximately $9 billion. Naval forces and installations in South Korea are much less extensive. Because the primary mission of U. S. Naval Forces Korea is to provide leadership and expertise in naval matters to area military commanders, there are no naval seagoing units permanently assigned to South Korea. Most of the Navy's facilities in South Korea are colocated with those of the Army at the Yongsan Garrison. Marine Corps. The Marine Corps's only division-sized unit stationed overseas–the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)–has been based on the Japanese island of Okinawa since 1971. To support the 20,000 marines stationed in Japan, including the MEF's 17,000 personnel, the Marine Corps maintains two large installations: Camp Butler, which covers 78,500 acres (or about one-quarter) of Okinawa, and Iwakuni Air Station on the island of Honshu. Those two installations represent a total U. S. investment of $6. 5 billion. Concerns About the Current Basing of U. S. Forces Overseas Asserting that the current basing structure is incapable of meeting future U. S. needs, the Administration accelerated an ongoing strategic review of that structure. The goal of the review is to develop a plan for forward basing that will make U. S. forces more agile and better able to respond to an unpredictable and ever changing global geopolitical situation. Defense analysts outside the Administration have voiced similar criticisms of the military's current basing structure. Below are some of the concerns that have been raised from both inside and outside the Administration about the forward basing of U. S. forces. Issues Common to Various Services Some concerns apply, to varying degrees, to all four services and their bases outside the United States. Those concerns include frictions with host nations, the cost of maintaining forward bases, the ability of forces stationed overseas to respond to likely conflicts, and the enduring utility of U. S. installations overseas. Host Nation Conflicts. All of the services are subject to disputes with the governments of host nations and their citizens over land use and the proximity of U. S. forces to civilian population centers and activities. Conflicts about land use have arisen because U. S. bases that were originally in remote locations have become increasingly surrounded by suburban or urban development. An example is the land occupied by the U. S. Yongsan Garrison in what is now downtown Seoul, land that local South Koreans envision using for other purposes. I was stationed in Tongduchon Korea in 1998 and again in 2008. Within that 10 year timeframe remote U. S. training areas were turned into greenhouses and cities. In various places around the world, U. S. training exercises conducted near sizable local populations have disrupted the lives of residents because of noise, destroyed private property, and resulted in the loss of life through accidents. As U. S. military personnel come into closer proximity with spreading urban or suburban populations, such incidents could become more common and affect support for the continued presence of large U. S. forces on foreign soil. The Cost of Basing Forces Overseas Maintaining forward based forces entails a marginal cost, in part because installations overseas, particularly in Europe, are more expensive to operate and support than those in the United States. Additional marginal costs include the family separation pay given to military personnel on unaccompanied tours and the cost of moving active duty service members, their goods, and sometimes their dependents to and from assignments overseas. The Congressional Research Service estimated that the total annual cost of basing 100,000 U. S. forces from all services in Europe rather than the United States was on the order of $1 billion to $2 billion in 1996. The Ability of Forces Based Overseas to Respond to Likely Conflicts Administration officials have questioned whether U. S. orces that are stationed primarily in Germany and South Korea are positioned appropriately to respond to probable future conflicts. They argue that conflicts are much more likely to occur in Africa, Western Asia, or the Middle East than anywhere in Western Europe. Similarly, conflicts may occur in Asia at locations other than on the Korean Peninsula like the civil unrest that has occurred recently in Indonesia and t he Philippines. Although all of the services have personnel stationed in Germany and all but the Navy in South Korea, that concern is most relevant for the Army because of its oncentration of forces in those countries. Most of the Administration's public statements about altering the current basing of U. S. forces abroad appear to focus on Army units. The Utility of the Current Overseas Basing Structure Although Administration officials have questioned the usefulness of some of the military's existing overseas infrastructure, they have said that some bases have obvious enduring utility. For example, the Air Force's Ramstein and Osan air bases serve as major hubs in Germany and South Korea, respectively. Army and other personnel and some equipment pass through those facilities when they arrive from the United States or depart for other parts of the globe, such as the Middle East. Those large installations, in which the United States has invested heavily to expedite the movement of forces and equipment into and out of Europe and Asia, are of high strategic value, and the Administration has explicitly stated that it will retain them. The training areas at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, which provide facilities unavailable anywhere else in Europe, will also be retained. Issues Specific to the Army As noted above, various characteristics set the Army apart in terms of forward basing: it has far more personnel stationed overseas than any other service, those forces are located in places that appear to be legacies of the Cold War, and Army units require the most time and expense to be transported to conflicts away from where they are based. For those reasons, many concerns about the present U. S. basing structure focus on that service. Army Forces in Europe The main concern expressed by Administration officials about the Army forces now based in Europe seems to be the amount of time they would need to respond to a conflict in the region. Although the two Army divisions stationed in Germany were well placed to defend NATO from Soviet attack, they cannot deploy quickly to conflicts outside Germany. For example, three months elapsed between the decision to move the 1st Armored Division from Germany to Iraq in March 2003 and its arrival in that theater. Military and Administration officials have indicated that the need for U. S. intervention s much more likely in Africa, Eastern Europe, or Western Asia than in Western Europe. Statements by U. S. commanders in Europe suggest that the Administration may be assessing how to speed the deployment of U. S. forces to places such as Nigeria, Uganda, Azerbaijan, and Djibouti. (Nigeria and Baku, Azerbaijan, are sources of oil; Uganda and Djibouti are potential staging bases for conducting operations in Africa to counter instability and terrorism. ) As was the case with Iraq, moving a division, or even part of one, from Germany to any of those locations would take a considerable amount of time. The units in Germany are heavy divisions equipped with tanks and armored vehicles, so the most efficient way to transport their equipment is by sea. Moving one heavy brigade combat team from Germany to locations in Africa or the Caspian region would take between 20 days and a month, and transporting an entire division's equipment would take another four days in all cases, only about five days faster than moving the same types of units from the United States. Those lengthy deployment times have raised questions about the utility of the Army forces now based in Germany. Another issue concerning those forces is the cost of keeping them in Europe rather than at bases in the continental United States. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that it costs about $1 billion more per year to maintain about 56,000 Army forces in Germany than if those troops were stationed in the United States–both because running bases and providing family housing and schools is more expensive in Germany than in the United States and because the Army must pay for overseas allowances and moves to and from assignments in Europe. If those forces are not needed to respond to any likely future conflict in the immediate region, observers might ask, why should the United States spend $1 billion each year to keep them there? Army Forces in South Korea Concerns about the 28,000 Army forces stationed in South Korea differ from those associated with Army forces based in Europe. Very few defense analysts question the need to keep substantial U. S. forces based in South Korea to deter North Korea from invading or attacking its southern neighbor. Instead, their concerns relate to four main issues: the condition and location of U. S. bases in South Korea, the instability in Army units that results partly from supporting large numbers of one year tours in South Korea, the quality of life of soldiers assigned to those tours, and whether Army units based in South Korea should be made more available to respond to conflicts elsewhere in the region. Problems with Bases in South Korea The condition and location of the Army's installations in South Korea are less than desirable. According to U. S. ilitary officials in that country, many of the Army's bases are obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair, including some Quonset huts from the Korean War era that still house soldiers. Most lack the amenities found at other U. S. bases overseas, and soldiers assigned to them are authorized to receive hardship duty pay of $150 per month. In addition, Army bases in South Korea are relatively small, spread out, and vulnerable. Units of the 2nd ID are scattered among 17 installations located north of the capital, Seoul, and within 30 miles of the North Korean border. That area is well within range of North Korean artillery placed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that runs between the two countries. Should North Korea attack South Korea, U. S. forces at those bases would be vulnerable to barrages from large numbers of artillery tubes. Secretary of Defense Donald Gates has argued that removing U. S. soldiers from such an immediate threat would give them an advantage in surviving and responding to an attack. Another issue about U. S. bases in South Korea that has been raised recently concerns the large U. S. resence in the center of Seoul known as the Yongsan Garrison. That 640 acre installation was on the outskirts of the city when it was built, but it is now in downtown Seoul, occupying valuable real estate and causing tensions with the local populace. Instability in Army Units The need to support forces stationed in South Korea causes turbulence in Army units based in the continental United States (CONUS). Because duty in South Korea is conside red hazardous and bases there are poorly equipped, family members do not accompany 80 percent of the soldiers serving tours in South Korea. Unaccompanied tours are limited to one year to minimize family separation, which means that almost the entire population of Army personnel in South Korea turns over every year. That turnover has a ripple effect on Army units based in CONUS, which must provide soldiers to replace those leaving South Korea and integrate new personnel. CBO estimates that, on average, war fighting units in CONUS experience turnover of 37 percent of their enlisted personnel every year, as soldiers leave for tours outside the continental United States, take administrative assignments in places such as the Pentagon, or leave the Army altogether. Some Army officials have asserted that high turnover in Army units reduces their cohesion and war fighting capability. The need to replace virtually all of the enlisted personnel in South Korea each year contributes about 6 percentage points of the total 37 percent turnover in CONUS war fighting units, CBO estimates. Quality of Life in South Korea Maintaining Army forces in South Korea on unaccompanied tours adversely affects the quality of soldiers' lives by contributing to family separation. An enlisted soldier spending 10 years in the Army could, on average, expect to spend a total of . years on unaccompanied tours, according to CBO's calculations. Although that is a small percentage overall, some specialties and junior enlisted personnel are more heavily represented in South Korea than in the Army as a whole, so their numbers could be much higher. Serving on unaccompanied tours has been shown to decrease the likelihood that a soldier will reenlist, which means that maintaining fo rces in South Korea under current basing arrangements may have an adverse effect on retention. Availability of Army Units in South Korea Because the Army forces based in South Korea are generally viewed as a deterrent to hostile behavior by North Korea, the 2nd ID and its two brigades have been considered unavailable to participate in any operations outside the Korean Peninsula. (By contrast, Army units based in Germany have been used in operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. ) The unavailability of the 2nd ID results partly because the division is based far from transportation hubs and partly because its units, which include many bulky and heavy vehicles, are not easy to deploy elsewhere. Secretary Gates recently raised the possibility of realigning the Army's forces in South Korea to make them more suitable for use in regional contingencies throughout Asia. He proposed making those forces more mobile by replacing their heavy armored vehicles with lighter and more modern vehicles and by moving them closer to transportation hubs south of Seoul. As we consider the world’s current economic state, what are we to do with such a large institution? 1. | Most of the roughly 15,000 soldiers assigned to units in South Korea other than the 2nd ID also rotate through their units on one-year unaccompanied tours. However, approximately 10 percent of them are on accompanied tours, in which the Army pays to move soldiers' families to South Korea and provides facilities for dependents while the soldiers are on assignment there. Those tours typically last for two or three years. | 2. | Not all of the soldiers assigned to a division would deploy with it. On average, 4 percent of Army personnel are ineligible to deploy overseas at any given time for various reasons, such as pregnancy, other health concerns, and family emergencies. Additional soldiers–as many as 35 percent in peacetime–may be ineligible because of Army personnel policies designed to ensure soldiers' quality of life. For a discussion of Army deployment rates in peacetime, see Bruce R. Orvis, Deployability in Peacetime, DB-351-A (Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND, 2002). | 3. | Some attrition, necessitating individual replacements, will inevitably occur over a deployment of six to 12 months. | 4. | For example, the United States has provided a small force to support the peacekeeping efforts of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula since 1982. Battalion-sized units of about 1,000 soldiers deploy for six-month assignments with the MFO. Similarly, units have been supporting operations in Bosnia and Kosovo on six-month deployments since 1996 and 1999, respectively. All told, the Army maintained an average of about 15,000 soldiers on operational deployments from 1997 through early 2001. | 5. | The third brigade of each of those divisions is based at Fort Riley, Kansas. Although the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions each have about 16,000 personnel assigned to them, when taking part in an operation they would typically be accompanied by several support units, which might include total of about 24,000 personnel. As a consequence, a division and its accompanying support units–known as a division slice–would include a total of about 40,000 personnel. | 6. | That and other replacement values cited in this study are based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Insta llations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at www. defenselink. mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003. pdf. That publication lists the replacement values of current U. S. defense facilities, including excess facilities that the United States still owns. | 7. | The Navy and Marine Corps have additional personnel based on board ships that may be anchored in European waters. | 8. | For example, two South Korean girls were killed in 2003 when they were struck by an Army armored vehicle during training exercises. | 9. | Stephen Daggett, Defense Budget: Alternative Measures of Costs of Military Commitments Abroad, CRS Report for Congress 95-726F (Congressional Research Service, June 16, 1995). | 10. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units can take a considerable amount of time to establish efficient operations in remote locations. Nevertheless, in some cases, they can provide a more rapid initial response than can Army forces that do not have staging bases near a conflict. | 11. | John T. Correll, â€Å"European Command Looks South and East,† Air Force Magazine, December 2003. | 12. | Ibid. | 13. | Vince Crawley, â€Å"Oil May Drive Troop Staging ,† Army Times, September 22, 2003, p. 30. | 14. | The reason is that U. S. transport aircraft (C-17s) can carry only one M1 tank at a time. Moving an entire heavy division would require about 1,500 C-17 flights, and moving one brigade combat team from the division would take up to 500 flights. Since the U. S. military is projected to have only about 140 C-17s by 2005, transporting heavy divisions and brigades by air is not practical. | 15. | Those numbers are explained in detail in Chapter 3. | 16. | General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U. S. Construction Plans in South Korea, GAO-03-643 (July 2003), p. 5. | 17. | See David J. Lynch, â€Å"DMZ Is a Reminder of Status in Korean Crisis,† USA Today, December 23, 2003, p. 11; and Thom Shanker, â€Å"Gates Reassures Seoul on Regrouping G. I. s,† New York Times, November 18, 2003, p. A10. | 18. | Although most personnel sent to South Korea each year come from CONUS-based units (because the Army generally tries not to assign soldiers to back-to-back tours outside the continental United States), some are drawn from the pool of new recruits completing their training. | 19. | Personnel assignments and career tracks vary greatly between enlisted personnel and officers in the Army. This analysis focuses on the enlisted force because it represents the vast majority of Army personnel–approximately 400,000 out of the Army's total strength of about 480,000. | 20. | CBO used a model of personnel turnover in its analysis that is based on a model developed by RAND. In its analysis, RAND estimated similar rates for both total annual enlisted turnover and the contribution from the need to support tours in South Korea. See W. Michael Hix and others, Personnel Turbulence: The Policy Determinants of Permanent Change of Station Moves, MR-938-A (Santa Monica, Calif. RAND, 1998). | 21. | See General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Longer Time Between Moves Related to Higher Satisfaction and Retention, GAO-01-841 (August 2001). | 22. | Robert Marquand, â€Å"U. S. Redeployments Afoot in Asia,† Christian Science Monitor, November 18, 2003. | http://www. eagleworldnews. com/2011/01/07/pentagon-plans-to-downsize-army-in-coming-years/ http://www. pacom. mil/we b/site_pages/uspacom/facts. shtml http://www. globalsecurity. org/military/ops/korea-orbat. htm http://www. stripes. om/news/pacific/korea/u-s-army-in-south-korea-begins-transformation-of-forces-1. 115890 Table 2-1. U. S. Bases and Forces Stationed in Europe and Asia | Forward-Based Personnel (Thousands) | Installations | | Combat| Support and Administration| Total| Total Number| Number with Replacement Value of More Than $1 Billion| Total Replacement Value (Billions of dollars)a| | Europe| Army|   | | Belgium| 0|   | 1|   | 1|   | 10|   | 0|   | 1|   |   | Germany| 25|   | 31|   | 56|   | 255|   | 3|   | 30|   |   | Italy| 1|   | 1|   | 2|   | 16|   | 0|   | 1|   |   | Other| 0|   | 1| 1|   | 13|   | 0|   | 1|   |   |   | Subtotal| 26|   | 34|   | 60|   | 294|   | 3|   | 33|   |   | Air Force| 14|   | 20|   | 34|   | 201|   | 5|   | 22|   | Navyb| 0|   | 10|   | 10|   | 15|   | 2|   | 7| à ‚  | Marine Corpsb| 0|   | 1|   | 1|   | 0|   | 0|   | 0|   |   | |   |   | Total | 40|   | 65|   | 105|   | 510|   | 10|   | 62|   |   | East Asia and the Pacificc| | Army|   | | Japan| 0|   | 2|   | 2|   | 15|   | 0|   | 3|   |   | South Korea| 13|   | 15|   | 28|   | 80|   | 2|   | 8|   |   |   | Subtotal| 13|   | 17|   | 30|   | 95|   | 2|   | 11|   |   | Air Force| 14|   | 10|   | 23|   | 67|   | 5|   | 18|   | Navyb| 0|   | 6|   | 6|   | 16|   | 6|   | 9|   | Marine Corpsb| 10|   | 10|   | 20|   | 2|   | 2|   | 6|   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | Total| 37|   | 43|   | 79|   | 180|   | 15|   | 44|   | Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at www. efenselink. mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003. pdf; Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Active-Duty Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A) (September 30, 2002); and other Defense Department data. Note: More-detailed breakdowns for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps appear in Tables A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A. a. Includes the replacement value of excess facilities that the United States still owns.